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Why the United States Has Failed to Ratify the CEDAW: 
A Look at Purported Problems with Ratification 
 
Courtney Goldsworthy 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (hereinafter Convention) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on December 18, 1979 and entered into force on September 3, 1981. The Convention is 
an international legal instrument that requires respect for an observance of women’s 
rights and represents an international human rights norm of women’s equality. The 
countries that have ratified the Convention have pledged to actively promote the equality 
of both men and women in all areas of life and have also pledged to end both de jure and 
de facto discrimination against women.1 However, the United States has yet to ratify the 
Convention.  
This paper examines some of the issues surrounding the lack of ratification of the 
Convention on the part of the United States. It begins by providing an overview of the 
Convention and examining the general difficulties of the United States in treaty 
ratification, and also surveys domestic arguments favoring and disfavoring ratification. It 
examines reservations within a broader framework by analyzing the articles within the 
Vienna Convention that are directly related to treaty reservations and then comparing this 
with reservations that are already in place by different signatories to the Convention. The 
last part of the paper looks at potential reservations, understandings and declarations of 
the United States, provides a comparison between some laws of the United States and 
laws of the Convention, and posits that despite the lack of ratification, and due to the 
Supreme Court trend of relying on international law in their more recent jurisprudence, 
                                                 
1  Julia Ernst, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299-367, 2 (1995). 
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the Convention is most likely to work its way into the American legal system through 
that means. Thus, it is clear that the only choice that the United States has is to ratify the 
Convention.  
Overview of the Convention 
The need to gather and consolidate the bulk of norms reflecting the rights of 
women in different international resolutions, declarations, and recommendations of 
international organizations was recognized in the early 1970’s.2 This effort culminated 
over five years of negotiations and discussion. Finally in March of 1980, the United 
Nations General Assembly presented the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination as the most recent instrument of a global character, reflecting a vow to 
protect women from discrimination. It was the only instrument referring to women’s 
rights that also had a monitoring system for its implementation.3  
The Convention has also been dubbed the “Charter of Human Rights of 
Women,”4 and rightfully so, as the aim of the Convention is to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women in the most comprehensive fashion.  
The Convention has six parts. Part I is dedicated to general principles and 
commitments. Part II refers to political and civil rights of women. Part III deals with 
social areas and pays special attention to women living in rural areas. Part IV is devoted 
to equality before the law and within the family. Part V contains follow up and 
surveillance provisions for the implementation of the Convention and establishes the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (hereinafter 
                                                 
2 Aída Gonzalez Martinez, Human Rights of Women, 5 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 157- 188, 166.  
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
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“Committee”). The sixth part focuses on procedural issues, issues of implementation, 
controversy and dispute resolution, and the presentation of reservations.5 
The Convention, under Article 1 “forbids any distinction, exclusion, or restriction 
between the sexes which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”6 A unique feature of the 
Convention is the recognition of discrimination that exists outside of the public sphere, 
such as domestic violence. 7  
 Article 2(a) and (e) of the Convention, respectively, states are required to 
“embody the principle of the equality of men and women” in their constitutions or 
appropriate legislation and to “modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs, and 
practices” that discriminate against women.8 States are also required to take appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination whether by individuals or organizations, and ensure 
that national tribunals and other public institutions are competent to afford women 
protection from any act of discrimination.9  
 Articles IV, V, and VI deal with temporary measures, stereotypes, and sexual 
violence. Article IV provides an affirmative action policy while guaranteeing that states 
may adopt, when necessary, special temporary measures to “shorten the inequality gap 
between men and women.”10 Article V recognizes cultural traditions and the impact of 
those on the condition of women, and places the common responsibility of educating 
                                                 
5 Id. at 167 
6 Julie A. Minor, An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.,137-53, 2 (1994). 
7 Id.  
8 Malvina Halberstam, The United States Ratification On The Convention On The Elimination Of All 
Forms Of Discrimination Against Women, 31(1) GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON., 49-96, 2 (1997). 
9 Id.  
10 Martinez, supra at 168. 
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children in the hands of both men and women. 11 Article VI refers to sexual abuse of 
women and the need to eliminate human trafficking and prostitution.12 
 Article II of the Convention requires states that have ratified the Convention to 
pursue “by all appropriate means” a “policy of eliminating discrimination against 
women.”13 Along with the requirements listed above, the Convention also calls for states 
to take appropriate measures to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary 
and all other practices which are based on the idea of inferiority or the superiority of 
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”14  
 Article VII requires parties to “ensure to women, on equal terms with men” the 
right to vote, “to hold public office,” to participate in the formulation of government 
policy, and to “participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned 
with the public and political life of the country.”15 Article X requires states to eliminate 
discrimination against women and to ensure them equal educational rights by providing 
the same conditions for access to studies at various educational levels. These conditions 
would include requiring for both sexes the same curricula, the same examinations, the 
same qualified teaching staff, and the same opportunity to academic benefits such as 
grants and scholarships, while additionally encouraging coeducation.16 
 Article XI focuses on discrimination in the workforce and requires states to “take 
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of 
                                                 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 169 
13 Ann E. Mayer, Reflections on the United States Reservations to CEDAW: Should the Constitution Be an 
Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. 727-823, 735 (1996). 
14 Id.  
15 Halberstam, supra at 2.   
16 Id.  
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employment” and to ensure equality to “the same employment opportunities.”17 Article 
XII focuses on the equality of rights to health care, including family planning.18Article 
XIII provides for economic and social equality, including family benefits, equal access to 
credit, and access to all sport and cultural activities.19 Article XIV applies the Convention 
to women in rural areas, Article XV deals with equality of women before the law and 
civil rights, and Article XVI deals with equal legal rights concerning matrimony and 
family relations.20 
 A significant feature of the Convention is that it specifies means that are to be 
pursued to achieve its purpose. Article XVII establishes a monitoring body, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, that holds the main 
task of observing parties’ performance and behavior.21 The Committee is comprised of 23 
“experts of high moral standing and competence in the field of women’s rights who are 
nominated and elected by the States’ Parties to serve four year terms.”22The Committee 
holds the responsibility of annually reviewing reports regarding the status of women’s 
rights filed by each party to the Convention. These reports must contain information 
about any legislative, judicial, administrative, or any other kind of measures taken to 
carry out the provisions of the Convention and must be filed within one year of acceding 
the Convention. The Convention does not authorize state parties to submit reports about 
one another, nor may individuals submit reports. The Committee has no power to 
undertake action against any self-reported violators. The sole remedy for violations is 
                                                 
17 Id.  
18 Martinez, supra at 169. 
19 Id. at 171 
20 Id.  
21 Rebecca J. Cook,  State Accountability Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women , in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES, P. 228-56, 647 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).  
22 www.unasa.org 
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encompassed by an annual report for the United Nations General Assembly based on the 
reports received by each individual state. Examining this, the enforcement mechanism is 
based solely on a self-monitoring structure and the extent of enforcement seems limited.23 
The members that make up the Committee are “elected taking into consideration not only 
traditional equitable geographical distribution, but also the representation of different 
forms of civilization, as well as the principle legal systems.”24 The Committee is 
empowered to perform analysis of the different methods of implementation of the 
Convention in various countries and to debate some of the main issues, including, but not 
limited to, contents of the reports, reservations of states when ratifying, and the “scope 
and significance of the Articles and their implementation.”25 
United States and the Ratification of the Convention26 
The United States is not among the signatories of the Convention. President 
Carter signed the Convention on July 17, 1980, but the United States has never ratified it. 
No action has been taken during the current Congressional session, but in 2002, although 
not voted on by the full Senate, the Convention was approved by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee.  
Since President Carter signed the treaty in 1980, ten years passed before the 
Committee held its first hearing.27 Although the House of Representatives does not have 
                                                 
23 Corbera, Michael, Women's Convention and the Equal Protection Clause, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J, 755-90, 
758 (1995). 
24 Martinez, supra at 173 
25 Id. at 174 
26   The process of ratifying a treaty in the United States is simple. Article II, Section 2 of the United States 
Constitution empowers the President to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. Once the 
treaty is signed, the President forwards it to the Senate. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee then 
holds hearings to consider ratification. A vote of committee members is taken to recommend ratification. 
From the Committee, it is sent to the Senate floor where a two-thirds majority vote is needed for 
ratification.  
27 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw/htm. 
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an official role in treaty ratification, they voiced their support for the Convention in 
House Resolution 166 in October of 1991.28 In the spring of 1993, 68 Senators signed a 
letter to President Clinton asking him to take the necessary steps to ratify the 
convention.29  
 Nearly ten years later in early 2002, the Convention won the support of the Bush 
Administration, as it was categorized as “generally desirable and [something that] should 
be approved.”30 Subsequently, a few hearings on the Convention were scheduled but 
postponed by the administration, which cited that a new Justice Department review of the 
Convention was necessary. After a few more delays and finally a hearing, the Convention 
was approved by the Committee by a vote of 12 to 7.31Since 2002, there have been no 
efforts made towards the ratification of the Convention. 
General Difficulties with Treaty Ratification 
There are general difficulties with the United States ratifying the Convention. One 
of the obstacles to ratification includes the “slow pace at which the Department of State 
reviews each treaty that has been signed and is under consideration by the United 
States.”32 The slow pace of ratification has been attributed to historical hostility and 
Congressional mistrust of international treaties, most notably those involving human 
rights. 33 It has also been attributed to the State Department’s limited resources and  
practice of “considering and reviewing each convention dealing with human rights 
consecutively…[thus placing] all other proposed conventions…on hold until the one 
                                                 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 www.unausa.org 
31 Id.  
32 Ernst, supra at 7. 
33 Id.  
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chosen for immediate action has been completely reviewed and processed through the 
ratification system.”34 
Another obstacle is the “desire of the United States to abide fully by the terms of 
any treaty to which it is a party.”35 There is the possibility of the United States making 
reservations to the Convention. However, with the number of possible conflicts with 
national law, “if the United States government ultimately determines the need to make a 
substantial number of reservations, the State Department has expressed the possibility of 
not ratifying the Convention at all.”36 
Domestic Arguments Relating to Ratification 
There are also many domestic arguments in favor of and against ratification of the 
Convention. To begin, the proponents of ratification emphasize that the Convention is the 
most effective way to advance women’s rights on a global level since it provides a 
universal definition of discrimination against women offering means for reviewing and 
encouraging compliance with it.37 Therefore, ratification would bolster the effort of the 
United States to improve the status of women around the world. It would also allow the 
United States to nominate an expert to sit on the Committee, therefore increasing the 
level of American international policy making in the area of women’s rights, and thus 
affirm the role of the United States as a global leader for human rights.38 
Opponents of ratification argue that ratification would pose serious threats to the 
nation’s sovereignty because it would relinquish too much power to the international 
community as treaty provisions would supersede United States law, and that the 
                                                 
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 www.unausa.org 
38 Id.  
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Convention aims to “implement a radical agenda that would undermine traditional moral 
and social values, including marriage, motherhood, family structure, and even Mother’s 
Day.”39 However, the Convention is compliant with the Constitution and, as discussed 
supra, the Committee does not have any real enforcement power and there is no 
disciplinary mechanism in place for failure to comply.40  
It is important to note that the treaty has been declared non-self executing, as 
noted infra, and therefore does not require any change to current domestic law.41 The 
Convention also does not seek to regulate family life and structure, but only adopt public 
information programs and educational programs to help eliminate current prejudices 
caused by traditional gender norms that hinder the full operation of the principle of social 
equality for women.42 Related to family structures, the Convention does not seek to 
interfere with parenting roles, but only calls for recognition of the “common 
responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and the development of their 
children” and “to promote what is in the best interests of the child” which is consistent 
with the law of the United States.43 
Related to family structure, parenting, and motherhood, opponents argue that the 
Convention promotes abortion and also would lead to federally sanctioned same-sex 
marriages.44 However, the Convention does not refer to abortion on an international level 
and even countries where abortion is illegal, such as Ireland and Rwanda, have ratified 
it.45 The State Department has stated that the Convention is “abortion neutral” and in 
                                                 
39 Id.  
40  www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw/htm. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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1994, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee added an understanding to the 
Convention, discussed infra, that Article XII, dealing with the power of the countries to 
determine the appropriate health care services offered related to family planning, does not 
include a right to an abortion.46 As for the promotion and sanctioning of same-sex 
marriages, the Convention’s terms are clearly aimed only at sex-based discrimination and 
not sexual-orientation based discrimination. The Convention would not compel the 
United States to change any laws or pass any same-sex marriage laws. In addition, much 
like the issue of abortion, many countries, such that have ratified the Convention, such as 
those coming from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East47, have laws 
banning same sex marriages.48 
Opponents also argue that the Convention is broad in its definition of 
discrimination which would lead to mass amounts of litigation and frivolous lawsuits.49 
However, the Convention seemingly only urges a change in the type of judicial standard 
of review afforded gender discrimination suits, as discussed infra, from mid-level 
scrutiny to strict scrutiny.50  
There have also been concerns that ratification of the Convention will force 
women to be sent into armed ground combat.51 However, the Convention does not 
                                                 
46 Id., See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (which held that there was no suspect class involved as an 
indigent woman desiring an abortion did not come within the limited category of recognized disadvantaged 
classes, and the fact that the impact of the regulation fell upon those who did not pay did not lead to a 
different conclusion. The Court further found that the regulation placed no obstacle to obtaining an abortion 
and did not created the indigency that made it difficult or impossible to obtain an abortion and the funding 
scheme did not impinge upon a fundamental rights. The Court held that the regulation rationally furthered 
the state’s legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth and it was not unreasonable to insist upon a 
prior showing of medical necessity to insure that state money was being spent only for authorized 
purposes.)  
47 http://en.wikpedia.org 
48 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw/htm. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
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require countries to send women into combat. There is no reference in the Convention to 
women in the military or women in combat. In addition, the 1997 Convention Committee 
report urging “full participation of women in the military” is not a requirement, but an 
observation that women’s absence in military decision-making councils hampers 
diplomacy, negotiations and peacekeeping, and peace-making efforts, and neglects to 
take note of the effect upon women and families of military decisions in times of 
conflict.52  
 Article X has also been a cause for concern among the opponents of ratification, 
who argue that the Convention is a threat to single sex schools and will be burdensome 
on public schools because it will require everything to be gender neutral.53 However, the 
language does not prohibit single-sex schools; it merely refers to the need for equal 
education facilities, text and other materials for both sexes, whether or not in single-sex 
or mixed schools. 
 Opponents lastly argue that the Convention, if ratified, would require the 
legalization of prostitution.54 However, the Committee has called for the 
decriminalization of prostitution in countries such as China where prostitution and 
trafficking of women and children are rampant, and not for all countries in general.55 
Regulation would allow victimized women to come forward without repercussions for 
treatment to prevent HIV, AIDS, and other STDS, to obtain health care and education, 
and to halt trafficking and sex-slavery practices.56 
                                                 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 www.unusa.org.  
56 Id.  
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 Although this list is not exhaustive, these conflicting views seem to warrant the 
assumption that if the United States was to ratify the Convention, it would not do so 
without making serious reservations.   
Reservations and the Implications of the Vienna Convention 
One of the most important means of limiting obligations under treaties is through 
the use of reservations. A reservation to a treaty is defined in the Vienna Convention as a 
“unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, 
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or 
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
State.”57 Reservations to treaties are typically infrequent with the exception of 
reservations to international human rights treaties. This factor highlights the “constant 
tension between encouraging universal participation in a human rights convention and 
protecting the integrity of the convention.”58Article XXVI of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties states the basic international law principle of pacta sunt servanda: 
“every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in 
good faith.”59 Article 2(d) defines reservation as a “unilateral statement, however phrased 
or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to 
a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of 
the treaty in their application to that State.”60 A state may enter a reservation when 
ratifying treaties that restrict or modify the effect of the treaties, subject to conditions that 
may vary from one treaty to the next. Article 19(a) provides that states can enter a 
                                                 
57 Text of the Vienna Convention, at http://untreaty.un.org.  
58 Cook, supra at 649. 
59 Text of the Vienna Convention, at http://untreaty.un.org.  
60 Id.  
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reservation unless “the reservation is prohibited by the treaty”61 or, under (b), “the treaty 
provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in 
question, may be made.”62 However, according to Article 19(c), the reservation cannot be 
entered if it “is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”63       
  Historically, tolerance of reservations to treaties of this nature has been 
encouraged for two reasons. One, the certainty of domestic impact of treaties dealing 
with human rights is less than that of a commercial treaty. Two, the treaty may have a 
dynamic force and the scope of interpretation may be broad.64 Thus, reservations provide 
states with an assurance that it can protect its interest to the fullest extent possible in the 
event it cannot comply fully with the terms of the treaty and prevention from humiliation 
if found in breach.65 
 Article 28(2) of the Convention states: “A reservation incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted,” thus simply 
reiterating the basic principle outlined in the Vienna Convention. Despite this provision, 
it is noted that “more reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most of the 
terms of the Convention have been entered to CEDAW than any other convention.”66  
 There are many difficulties with reconciling the compatibility rule of Article 
19(c)(see above) of the Vienna Convention and the acceptance and objections rule of 
Article 20(4). Article 20(4) states:  
                                                 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id.   
64 Cook, supra at 650. 
65 Id.  
66 Mayer, supra at 737. 
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“In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs, and unless the treaty 
otherwise provides: 
(a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving 
State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the treaty is in 
force for those States:  
(b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the 
entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless 
a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State: 
(c) an act expressing a State’s consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a 
reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted 
the reservation.”67 
The compatibility rule provides that “a state may not formulate a reservation 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty concerned”68 and the objections 
rule provides that “a reserving state becomes a party to the treaty regarding all other 
states that expressly accept the reservation, do not object to it or that object without 
expressing a definite intention to preclude the entry into force of the treaty between the 
reserving state and itself.”69  
Three interpretations have evolved out of this conflict between the two articles. 
According to the first interpretation, which holds that the test of admissibility of a 
reservation lies within acceptance of it by other states, “the content of the reservation is 
relevant only to the interpretation of the rights and obligations of the treaty parties.”70 
                                                 
67 Text of the Vienna Convention, at http://untreaty.un.org.  
68 Cook, supra at 657. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.   
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The second interpretation differentiates between the articles by holding that “[a]rticle 19 
governs the ‘permissibility’ of a reservation, an incompatible reservation being 
impermissible and therefore illegal….and [a]rticle 20…concerns the issue of 
‘opposability’ of a permissible reservation, and this involves inquiring into the reactions 
of the [p]arties to that reservation and the effects of such reaction.”71 The final 
interpretation views the formulation of an incompatible reservation as “a wrongful act 
entailing the reserving state’s international responsibility regarding the other states 
parties…. and not necessarily a breach of the treaty itself, but a breach of the legal norm 
embodied in the Vienna Convention.”72 The three views basically look at the language of 
the reservation only, the intent of the parties, and whether or not the basic aim of the 
Vienna Convention was violated. 
Reservations to the Convention (CEDAW) Currently in Place 
 Many problems arise with permitting reservations to international human rights 
treaties. For instance, the number of reservations, their content, and their scope may 
undermine effective implementation of the Convention and tend to weaken respect for the 
obligations of states parties. The CEDAW has been concerned with the issue of 
reservations to the Convention, not only because of the large number of reservations, but 
also because of the content of the reservations. When drafting the Convention, the 
drafters had to make a choice between maximizing participation in the project and 
maintaining the integrity of the document. It has been argued that the former was the 
chosen path.73 The large number of reservations, at least twenty-five parties making a 
                                                 
71 Id.  
72 Id..   
73 Minor, supra at 3. 
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total of sixty-eight reservations,74 makes the Convention among the most heavily 
reserved of international human rights instruments. The Convention allows reservations, 
but does not provide clear and objective criteria to determine whether the reservations 
have been made in accordance with the requirements of the Convention.75 To address this 
issue, the CEDAW adopted a declaration that was submitted to the General Assembly in 
1998 that stated “[a]rticle 2 has fundamental importance for the object and purpose of the 
Convention and that upon ratifying the Convention, the states parties expressed their 
agreement that all forms of discrimination should be condemned,76 and further agreed to 
put into practice the strategies provided for in items (a) to (g) of Article 2 to eliminate 
discrimination.” It was further noted that “neither the traditional, religious, or cultural 
practices nor the national laws and policies, incompatible with the Convention, can 
justify the violation of the provisions of the convention.”77 
A common type of reservation to human rights treaties is based on a religious 
belief or practice. For example, many Islamic countries have entered reservations, both 
on a general and a specific level, when ratifying human rights treaties. In terms of the 
Convention, there are many candid examples, including, but not limited to the following:  
¾ The Government of the Republic of Maldives will comply with the 
provisions of the Convention, except those which the Government many 
consider contrary to the principles of Islamic Sharia upon which the laws 
and traditions of the Maldives are founded. 78 
                                                 
74 Id.   
75 Id.  
76 Martinez, supra at 175. 
77 Id.. at 176.  
78 DAMROSCH LORI, & HENKIN LOUIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (West Group 2001).  
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¾ The Arab Republic of Egypt is willing to comply with the content of this 
article (Article 2 of the Convention), provided that such compliance does 
not run counter to the Islamic Sharia.79 
¾ It is clear that the child’s acquisition of his father’s nationality is the 
procedure most suitable for the child and that this does not infringe upon 
the principle of equality since it is customary for a woman to agree that the 
children shall be of the father’s nationality. (Egypt’s reservation to Article 
9 of the Convention). 80 
¾ The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan hereby registers its reservation and 
does not consider itself bound by the provisions of Article 9, paragraph 2, 
article 15, paragraph 4 (a woman’s residence and her domicile are with her 
husband. 81 
¾ Iraq has made unexplained reservations to Article 2(f) and (g), which, 
respectively, require states to take all appropriate measures including 
legislation to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and 
practices which constitute discrimination against women, and repeal penal 
laws that discriminate against women. 82 
¾ Libya made a general reservation stating that accession to the Convention 
cannot conflict with Islamic laws on “personal status.”83 
¾ In 1984, Bangladesh stated that it did not consider “as binding upon itself 
the provisions of articles 2.13(a) and 16.1(c) and (f) as they conflict with 
                                                 
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Minor, supra at 3. 
83 Id.  
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Sharia law based on Holy Koran and Sunna (the example of the 
Prophet).”84 
Although these reservations have been accepted, it is clear that they do not promote the 
objective of gender equality of the Convention, nor do they promote the goal of 
eliminating discrimination. In actuality, these reservations tend to promote gender 
discrimination and essentially nullify many principles of the Convention because they 
provide states parties with essentially “unfettered discretion in determining the extent to 
which they would be bound by the relevant [Convention] norms.”85 It has also been 
argued that the vagueness of these reservations in general amounts to pronouncements 
that countries would uphold any “relevant domestic laws that were deemed officially to 
flow from Islamic requirements at the expense of conflicting CEDAW obligations.”86 
These Islamic reservations are vastly different from other countries that have 
entered reservations. The Islamic reservations essentially are substantive reservations, 
whereas reservations by other states parties tend to be more procedural in nature. 
Examples illustrate the difference between relatively harmless procedural reservations 
and reservations that trigger uncertainty about whether the ratifying state has actually 
accepted the Convention obligations. 
France entered several obligations upon ratification, including a reservation 
concerning the right to choose a family name. Article 16(1)(g) states that a husband and 
wife would have the same personal rights, “including the right to chose a family name, a 
profession and an occupation.”87 As an issue of symbolic importance, a woman’s right to 
                                                 
84 Mayer, supra at 738. 
85 Id. at 739. 
86 Id. at 738. 
87 Id. at 739. 
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pass on her name to her children is seemingly crucial, but lacks an overall substantive 
effect on the purpose of the Convention, i.e., the preservation and implementation of an 
“overall equality of Frenchwomen and their ability to function on par with men in French 
society.”88 French acceptance of all other major provisions of the Convention also 
indicated that France was not “taking a stance opposed to the purpose of the 
[Convention].”89 
The 1984 ratification of the Convention by Spain included a short reservation 
stating “that [Convention] ratification shall not affect the constitutional provisions 
concerning succession to the Spanish crown.”90 Although this reservation on its face 
appears to be discriminatory against Spanish women, “it is sharply limited in terms of 
immediate impact…and only a few Spanish bluebloods could ever be affected by this 
exception.”91 Much like the French reservation, this reservation lacks any real substantive 
effect on the overall acceptance and implementation of the Convention.  
Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations of the United States 
 
In the event that the United States chooses to ratify the Convention, it has been 
argued that it would not do so without entering extensive reservations. When the 
Convention was submitted to the Senate in 1980, the State Department included a 
memorandum identifying potential conflicts with U.S. law and recommended appropriate 
reservations, understandings92 or declarations93 to that effect.94 The underlying premise of 
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the State Department memo is that “ratification of the Convention would not change 
domestic law.”95 The State Department memo listed four reservations, three 
understandings and two declarations.  
In addition to the general recommendations above, the State Department 
concluded that four reservations were necessary to bring the Convention into compliance 
with United States law. The reservations involve private conduct, women in the military, 
comparable worth, and maternity leave.96 The proposed reservations specifically provide 
that the United States accepts no obligation under the Convention “(1) to enact legislation 
or to take any other action with respect to private conduct except as mandated by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States97; (2) to assign women to all military units and 
positions which may require engagement in direct combat98; (3) to enact legislation 
establishing the doctrine of comparable worth99; and (4) to introduce maternity leave with 
                                                                                                                                                 
93 Text of the Vienna Convention, at http://untreaty.un.org., (The term “declaration” is often deliberately 
chosen to indicate that the parties do not intend to create binding obligations but merely want to declare 
certain aspirations.) 
94 Minor, supra at  4. 
95 Halberstam, supra at 56. 
96 Id. 
97 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Appendix 3,(“The 
Constitution and laws of the United States establish extensive protections against discrimination reaching 
all forms of governmental activity as well as significant areas of non-governmental activity. However 
individual privacy and freedom from governmental interference in private conduct are also recognized as 
among the fundamental values of our free and democratic society. The United States understands that by its 
terms the Convention requires broad regulation of private conduct, in particular under Articles 2, 3, and 5. 
The United States does not accept any obligation under the Convention to enact legislation or to take any 
other action with respect to private conduct except as mandated by the Constitution of and law of the 
United States.”)   
98 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Appendix 3,(“Under 
current US law and practice, women are permitted to volunteer for military service without restriction and 
women in fact serve in all US armed services, including combat positions. However, the United States does 
not accept an obligation under the Convention to assign women to all military units and positions which 
may require engagement in direct combat.”) 
99 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Appendix 3,(“US law 
provides strong protections against gender discrimination in the area of remuneration, including the right to 
pay for equal work in jobs that are substantially similar. However, the United States does not accept any 
obligation under this Convention to enact legislation establishing the doctrine of comparable worth as that 
term is understood in the US.” ) 
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pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or 
social allowances.100” 
As for the understandings, the State Department expressed concern with the 
interpretation of some articles in a way that limited the freedom of speech. Therefore, it 
was recommended that the United States would not be obligated to adopt any legislation 
or measure that would restrict rights under the First Amendment in any way, so long as 
the rights in question were constitutionally protected. 101 For example, since obscenity is 
not a category of protected speech, any restrictions on such activity or speech would not 
fall under the protection of the First Amendment and conflict with the Convention, but, 
political speech, as a protected category, would.  
The second understanding proposed was in relation to Article XII of the 
Convention which permits the states to determine appropriate health care standards in 
relation to family planning, pregnancy, confinement and post-natal care. The proposed 
understanding was that this article did not mandate health care free of charge.102  
The third understanding proposed was that the “United States understands that 
this Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it 
exercises jurisdiction over the matters covered (by the Convention), and otherwise by the 
state and local governments….[t]o the extent that state and local governments exercise 
jurisdiction over such matter, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take 
                                                 
100Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Appendix 3, “Current 
US law contains substantial provisions for maternity leave in many employment situations but does not 
require paid maternity leave. Therefore the United States does not accept an obligation under Article 
11(2)(b) to introduce maternity leave with pay or comparable social benefits without loss of former 
employment, seniority, or social allowances.”  
101 Halberstam, supra at 58. 
102 Text of the CEDAW, www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw/htm. 
 
 22
appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.”103 This meant that 
Congress would not substitute federal legislation for state regulation on matters regulated 
by state and local governments, but the United States was not limiting the application of 
the Convention to only those matters which were presently subject to federal 
regulation.104 
The State Department also proposed two declarations. The first states that “[t]he 
United States declares that, for purposes of its domestic law, the provisions of the 
Convention are non-self executing.”105 This bars the invocation of the Convention in any 
United States court, thus negating any legal right that could be invoked, i.e., the 
possibility of asserting the Convention as a defense or a claim.106 
The second declaration, states “[w]ith reference to Article 29(a)(2), the United 
States declares that it does not consider itself bound by the provisions of Article 29(a)(1). 
The specific consent of the United States to the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice concerning disputes over the interpretation or application of this Convention is 
required on a case-by-case basis.”107  
There are different arguments for and against ratifying the Convention with 
reservations. Supporters of ratification argue that “it should be ratified because it is 
basically compatible with U.S. law and would not effectuate any change.”108 Detractors 
argue that if the United States were to ratify without reservations, the Convention would 
be “too broad and would have far-reaching and undesirable effects in the United 
                                                 
103 Halberstam, supra at 58.  
104 Text of the CEDAW, www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw/htm. 
105 Id.  
106 Minor, supra at 60. 
107 Text of the CEDAW www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw/htm. 
108 Minor, supra at 4. 
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States.”109 It is also argued that the practical effect of ratification would be minimal 
because of “the inherent limitations of a federal system,…[the fact that] 
[u]nconstitutional treaty provisions are never given any effect as law,…and without a 
self-executing provision, the courts would probably hold the Convention to be non-self 
executing.”110 
Constitutional Implications of Ratification 
 
Judical Review 
 
It is argued that the law of the United States, measured by the principles outlined 
in the Convention is deficient, as it fails to promote the equality of women. For example, 
in equal protection cases involving gender discrimination, the Supreme Court has only 
been willing to extend a mid-level review of scrutiny, as opposed to strict scrutiny which 
is applied in cases of racial discrimination, discrimination based upon national origin, and 
discrimination based upon alienage, the “suspect classes.” Gender is not considered to be 
a “suspect class” in American jurisprudence, but rather a “quasi-suspect class.”  
     The case that enunciated the intermediate standard of scrutiny that is applied to gender 
was Craig v. Boren111. Craig was a successful challenge to an Oklahoma statute that 
forbade the sale of “3.2%” beer (supposedly non-intoxicating) to males under the age of 
21, and to females under the age of 18. The constitutional claim was that the statute 
denied equal protection to males aged 18 to 20. The Court articulated the applicable 
standard as being that “classifications of gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”112 The 
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standard applied to racial discrimination is that the classification will be upheld only if it 
is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Any statute that is subjected 
to strict scrutiny almost always fails. Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, provides 
more leeway for statutes to pass judicial review and be held valid.  
 Craig, and the intermediate scrutiny standard applied to gender, is an example of 
how the Equal Protection Clause falls short of an equality guarantee for women. Women 
are afforded limited protection, but this standard of scrutiny applied by judges provides 
more room for the judges to factor in stereotypes to their rulings. Article 2(a) of the 
Convention calls for constitutions and laws to embody equality and Article 5(a) calls for 
the eliminations of prejudices based on roles borne out of gender stereotypes.113 The 
United States law, especially after a close examination of the status of women under the 
Equal Protection Clause, is representative of the kinds of problems that the Convention 
was created to eliminate.  
 This conflict between the Convention and the Equal Protection Clause is probably 
one that could not be cured through a simple reservation. Reservations to international 
treaties are properly used by states parties to limit enforceability and applicability 
particular provisions. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties prohibits 
reservations that are incompatible with the object and the purpose of the treaty. Thus, if 
the Convention is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, it cannot be cured 
through reservations because it unconstitutionally would be tied to the Convention’s very 
object and purpose.114 The Convention seeks to give women extra protection in order to 
further the object and aim of eliminating discrimination against them. In Craig, the court 
                                                 
113 Mayer, supra at 788.  
114 Corbera, supra at 780. 
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expressly stated that it did not matter whether the discrimination operated against men or 
women. Thus, Equal Protection jurisprudence is clearly at odds with the object and 
purpose of the Convention. 
Implementation and the Duty of Good Faith 
 Another problem lies with the non-self executing declaration. This declaration 
raises international law concerns, constitutional concerns, and policy concerns.  
Under international law, each state is given latitude in determining implementation of its 
treaty obligations. Some states have provisions that treaties automatically become state 
law, while others require implementing legislation. Some systems, like the United States, 
have a hybrid system of self-executing and non self-executing treaties. There is a good 
faith requirement in international law, meaning, if a state ratifies a treaty, it is required to 
implement it. Ratifying a treaty and then failing to provide any implementation is a 
breach of this good faith duty.115 
International Law as Support for Validity of Supreme Court Decisions 
Despite the fact that the United States has made the declaration that the 
Convention is not self-executing, which bars the invocation of the Convention in any 
United States court, thus negating any possibility of asserting the Convention as a defense 
or a claim,116 this does not mean that it will not appear in our jurisprudence. Recently the 
Supreme Court has been following a trend of providing citations of international law as 
an evidentiary tool supporting the validity of their decisions. For example, in Lawrence v. 
Texas117, the recent case overruling a Texas statute barring same sex sodomy, Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, cites a decision by the European Court of Human 
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Rights (ECHR) allowing homosexual conduct as evidence of a lack of consensus on such 
conduct’s illegality.  Also, in Atkins v. Virginia118 the Court struck down laws providing 
that the mentally retarded could be sentenced to death using foreign authorities. Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority opinion found that “it is fair to say that a national 
consensus has developed against [execution of the mentally retarded].”119 This consensus 
finding noted that the Court had found support from many different groups, but most 
notably it cited an amicus brief filed by the European Union and concluded that the brief 
proved that “within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”120 
The most notable example of this is within the context of the juvenile death 
penalty. In Roper v. Simmons121, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the 
imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under eighteen years old. The Court 
noted that “[t]he overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death 
penalty is not controlling here, but provides respected and significant confirmation for the 
Court’s determination that the penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 
18....The United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official 
sanction to the juvenile penalty. It does not lessen fidelity to the Constitution or pride in 
its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by 
other nations and peoples underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage of freedom.” 122   
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In Roper, the majority cited to international authority to support the validity of its 
decision. In cases prior to Roper dealing with the juvenile death penalty, international law 
was also cited in the majority and dissenting opinions. In Thompson v. Oklahoma123, the 
court found that the imposition of the death penalty on persons under 16 years of age was 
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Stevens, writing for the 
majority, states “[w]e have previously recognized the relevance of the views of the 
international community in determining whether or not a punishment is cruel and 
unusual. See Trop v. Dulles, Coker v. Georgia, Enmund v. Florida. (citations 
omitted).”124  Relying on Thompson, the dissent in Stanford v. Kentucky125,held that it 
was constitutional to impose the death penalty on juveniles over age 16, noted that 
“indicators of contemporary standards of decency should inform our consideration of the 
Eighth Amendment are opinions of respected organizations.”126 The dissent included as 
an indicator of this contemporary standard of decency an amicus brief submitted by the 
International Human Rights Law Group.127 
Through opinions like Roper, Lawrence, Atkins, Thompson and Stanford, the 
Court is clearly acknowledging the importance of the way the United States is perceived 
in the global context and clearly stating that reliance or utilization of international 
standards as guidance in rendering opinions is not inconsistent with our system of law. 
Although the United States has not ratified the Convention, it is safe to surmise that if a 
case came before the court dealing with the issue of gender equality, the Convention will 
be quoted as an authoritative amalgam of the world opinion on gender equality issues. 
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Conclusion 
In sum, the Convention provides the most comprehensive international 
declaration of women’s legal rights. Some potential reasons for non-ratification by the 
United States have included the pace at which the State Department ratifies treaties, the 
limited amount of resources the State Department has to review treaties, and the overall 
desire of the United States to want to fully abide by and comply with the terms of a 
treaty. It is also possible that some of the domestic arguments against ratification have 
been influential in preventing the United States from going forth with ratifying the 
Convention. 
If the United States did ratify the Convention, it would not do so without making 
many reservations, which must be compatible with the parameters of reservations laid out 
in the Vienna Convention. The principle that reservations must not be incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty, as outlined in Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, is an integral part of the Convention, as it is stated verbatim in 
Article 28(2) of the Convention. Although this is directly stated, there still remain 
problems with interpreting the provisions of the Vienna Convention that deal with the 
rules of objection and the rules of compatibility, so this makes it difficult to discern how 
exactly the rules apply to the Convention.  
       The Convention is the most heavily reserved human rights treaty as cited by the 
examples provided supra. Some of the reservations seem very substantive, in that they 
border on being compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, and thus may 
be in violation of the Convention per Article 28(2). Other reservations are more 
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procedural in nature and do not seem to negatively impact any object or purpose of the 
treaty.              
  United States reservations include reservations related to constitutional issues, 
military issues, maternity leave issues, and finally the reservation to the implementation 
of the necessary legislation to make the treaty forceful and effective on a domestic level. 
Supporters of ratification argue that it is possible due to the basic compatibility between 
United States law and the Convention. However, the apparent tension between our Equal 
Protection Clause and the Convention make it highly unlikely that ratification without 
drastic reservations will occur anytime soon. And, if it does occur, the reservations may 
be substantive in nature and thus go against the object and purpose of the Convention and 
violate the good faith provision of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and 
Article 28(2) of the Convention itself.  
However, the Supreme Court trend of relying on international documents to 
provide evidentiary support for the validity of their decisions points to the possibility that 
if a gender equality issue came before the Court, it is highly likely that the Convention 
would be cited in the opinion because of its representation as the collection of gender 
norms from around the world. Thus, the United States should ratify the Convention.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30
 
 
 
 
 
 
